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"Putting the wrong questions is not likely to beget right
answers even in law."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter*
At the beginning of 1967, Continental Can Company's plant
in Harvey, Louisiana had only three black employees out of
more than four hundred hourly workers. That year the com-
pany began hiring more black workers, and by 1971 it had over
fifty black employees. Then cutbacks in production began and,
in accordance with the collective agreement, employees were laid
off in reverse order of their plant seniority. By 1973, only two
black employees were working and the first 138 persons on the
recall list were white. Black employees who had been laid off
brought a class action claiming that because the company's past
discriminatory hiring policies had prevented blacks from ac-
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1939, J.D. 1942, University of
Illinois; J.S.D. 1952, Columbia University. Member, New York Bar.
tt J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School.
* Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 170 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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cumulating seniority, use of the "last hired, first fired" layoff
procedure violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
The federal district court, in Watkins v. Steel Workers Local
2369,2 agreed that Continental Can's seniority-based layoff pro-
cedure violated Title VII by perpetuating the effects of prior
hiring discrimination. Judge Cassibry drew on two existing lines
of seniority cases, involving departmental transfer and union
hiring halls, to find a common principle: "[E]mployment prefer-
ences cannot be allocated on the basis of length of service or
seniority, where blacks were, by virtue of prior discrimination,
prevented from accumulating relevant seniority."
3
Judge Cassibry ordered immediate reinstatement of enough
laid-off black employees to restore the ratio of black-to-white
employees at the Harvey plant to its 1971 level, and ordered
that all future layoffs be allocated among employees in accord-
ance with this ratio. All future recalls were to be made on a
one-to-one basis from separate black and white recall lists until
all laid-off black employees had been recalled. 4 In Judge Cas-
sibry's words, this relief was not intended "to compensate the
blacks who were not hired by the Company between 1945 and
1965," but was "designed to insure that, because the Company
hired no blacks for twenty years, the plant will not operate with-
out black employees for the next decade.
5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, 6 hold-
ing that
an employer's use of a long-established seniority system
for determining who will be laid-off, and who will be
rehired, adopted without intent to discriminate, is not
a violation of Title VII or § 1981, even though the use
of the seniority system results in the discharge of
more blacks than whites to the point of eliminating
blacks from the work force, where the individual em-
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) also affords a federal
remedy against employment discrimination on grounds of race. Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). The courts have generally held that the substantive
law of Title VII applies as well in cases brought under § 1981. Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 197 4),petition for cert.filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1975) (No. 74-1064).
2 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
' 369 F. Supp. at 1226.
4 Judge Cassibry's order appears in full at 8 FEP Cas. 729, 730-31 (E.D. La. 1974).
5 369 F. Supp. at 1231.
516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ployees who suffer layoff under the system have not
themselves been the subject of prior employment
discrimination.
7
The court of appeals pointed out that the district court's
order would require recalling black employees with five years
seniority while denying recall to white employees with twenty-
two years seniority. In fact, the recalled black employees would
have been under eight years of age when the white employees
denied recall were originally hired. "To hold the seniority plan
discriminatory as to the plaintiffs in this case requires a determi-
nation that blacks not otherwise personally discriminated against
should be treated preferentially over equal whites."'8 Such prefe-
rential treatment on the basis of race was held to be specifically
prohibited by section 703(j) of the Act.9
Apart from the statutory prohibition against preferential
treatment, the court suggested that the use of the "last hired,
first fired" seniority clause was protected under section 703(h),
which expressly exempts "bona fide" seniority systems from the
strictures of the Act.' 0 Even if the seniority system had a dispro-
portionate impact on black employees, this was not the result of
an intent to discriminate. The court refused to require the grant-
ing of "fictional" seniority to black employees as a precondition
to deeming the seniority system "bona fide" within the contem-
plation of section 703(h).
Like both courts in the Watkins case, most recent commen-
tary concerning the use of seniority in layoffs" has described the
7 Id. at 44-45.
8 Id. at 46.
9 Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
10 Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . .provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(h) (1970).
11 See, e.g., Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 177 (1975); Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic
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problem in terms of who is entitled to a limited number of full-
time jobs, thereby assuming a "winner take all" game in which
the winners continue fully employed and the losers are out on
the street.' 2 Most union and management groups apparently
share this assumption. The problem, so posed, creates a direct
confrontation between the national policy of encouraging in-
creased minority employment and statutory prohibitions against
preferential treatment or quotas based on race or sex.
In determining who shall be the winners in this "winner take
all" game, most unions have insisted on protecting contractual
seniority rights,' 3 even when this would place the heaviest bur-
den of layoffs on recently hired minorities and women who as
"last hired" are the "first fired."' 4 On the other side, some civil
rights advocacy groups have called for an abandonment of
seniority in ordering layoffs on the ground that it perpetuates an
insuperable obstacle to achieving equality of employment op-
portunity. 15 The positions of various government agencies on
this issue have been neither consistent nor clear.' 6 As a result,
Downturn, 28 VAND. L. REV. 487 (1975); Note, Last Hired, First Fired Seniority, Layoffs, and
Title VII: Questions of Liability and Remedy, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 343 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Note, Seniority]; Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1544 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note].
12 The following statement is representative:
The concern expressed in Congress that Title VII would disrupt seniority sys-
tems was closely tied to a concern that the Act would be interpreted to require
racial balance. In denying that Title VII would affect seniority, the supporters
of the Act seem to have had most clearly in mind that employers would not be
required to achieve racial balance ly firing whites in order to hire blacks. The legisla-
tive history may not be determinative, but it does cast considerable doubt on the
propriety of altering seniority solely to correct racial imbalance caused by past dis-
crimination.
Harvard Note, supra note 11, at 1569 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
An exception is Blumrosen & Blumrosen, The Duty to Plan for Fair Employment Revis-
ited: Work Sharing in Hard Times, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1082 (1975).
"3 See, e.g., 1 LAB. REL. REP. 90 LRR 102-03 (Sept. 22, 1975) (resolution of AFL-
CIO Industrial Union Department Convention in support of continued reliance on
seniority in layoffs).
14 Length of service was a factor in determining order of layoff in all but one of
364 contracts analyzed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in a 1972 study. U.S. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-13, LAYOFF, RECALL, AND
WORKSHARING PROCEDURES 31 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BLS, LAYOFF].
" See, e.g., 1 LAB. REL. REP. 89 LRR 275-76 (July 14, 1975) (NAACP resolution on
seniority, calling on the government to ensure that minority workers be hired pursuant
to affirmative action and exempted from the operation of seniority in a layoff situa-
tion). Cf. id. 90 LRR 102 (Sept. 22, 1975) (speech by Vernon Jordan, Jr., Executive
Director of the National Urban League).
16 Compare Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Proposed Guidelines on Work
Allocation (Draft of March 14, 1975), reprinted in 58 BNA DAILY LAB. REP. A-14 (March
25, 1975) [hereinafter cited as EEDC Proposed Guidelines] with 1 LAB. REL. REP. 89
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employers whose past discriminatory hiring policies are in large
part responsible for the present vulnerable position of women
and minorities in the work force are caught in a cross-fire of
inconsistent demands from unions, civil rights advocacy groups,
government agencies, and their own dissatisfied employees.
17
To the extent that the problem is posed in terms of who
shall work and who shall not, or whether senibrity must govern
or whether it must go, there seems to be little realistic doubt
about the outcome. Unions and employers, left to their own
devices, have little incentive to depart from their present prac-
tices; the union's strong interest in preserving seniority rights
will be acquiesced in or supported by the employer. Nor is it
likely that the courts will require unions and employers to aban-
don seniority in determining the order of layoff; three courts of
appeals have refused to do so. 8 This judicial refusal to intervene
seems almost inevitable as long as the courts see their only alter-
native as one of substituting winners in a "winner take all" game.
To pose the question in terms of who shall work and who
shall not, however, is to pose the wrong question; it assumes that
scarce work should be allocated on the basis of winner take all.
Preceding the selection of which employees will be laid off is the
decision whether some are to be laid be off while others are
LRR 407 (Aug. 25, 1975) (statement of J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights).
In April, 1975, the EEOC deferred indefinitely issuance of its Proposed
Guidelines, which warned employers against the use of a seniority system whose opera-
tion would have a disproportionate impact on women and minorities, after a critical
reaction from other agencies to which the draft had been circulated. Assistant Attorney
General Pottinger criticized the EEOC draft as "likely to cause unnecessary dispute and
disagreement, as well as arouse expectations which are not likely to be fulfilled." 88
BNA DAILY LAB. REP. A-6, A-7, (May 6, 1975).
17 In Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1975) (No. 75-182), the
employer sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court to determine which of
two allegedly conflicting contracts, one a conciliation agreement with the EEOC and the
other the union collective bargaining agreement, should govern his policy on layoffs.
18See Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.), petition for cert.
fided, 44 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1975) (No. 75-182); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb.
24 (1975) (No. 74-1064). Several cases involving the issue of seniority in layoffs are
collected and discussed in Note, Seniority, supra note 11, at 345-57. More recent cases
include Schaefer v. Tannian, 10 FEP Cas. 897 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Jones v. Pacific In-
termountain EXPRESS, 10 FEP Cas. 913 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Acha v. Beame, 10 FEP Cas.
1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 11 FEP Cas. 827
(E.D. Mo. 1975) (semble). Contra, Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Local 759, United Rubber
Workers, 11 FEP Cas. 703 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
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given all the available work. It is that prior decision-that some
of the employees shall be given all the available work while
others are to be given none-that gives present effect to past
hiring discrimination. The useful question, if we are to get use-
ful answers, is whether, and within what limits, an employer can
determine that available work will be distributed unequally
among his employees rather than shared equally, when the un-
equal distribution perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.
The thesis of this Article is that the solution to the problem
of the discriminatory impact of layoffs on the work forces to
employers with a history of past discrimination lies not in an
attack on seniority, but in an avoidance of layoff; that answers
are not to be found in formulas for the order of layoff, but
rather in devices for distributing available work. The question
whether the employer has violated the statute should focus on
the employer's decision to lay off when that layoff will have a
discriminatory impact, and the remedy should be directed to-
ward requiring the employer to share the work in a way that will
avoid the discriminatory impact. 19 This solution will preserve the
principle that seniority shall determine the order of layoff, but
will at the same time protect the employment gains of minorities
during periods of recession.
Part I of this Article attempts to elaborate and refine the
reasons for supporting seniority as an ordering principle in em-
ployment, reasons which led Congress affirmatively to endorse
and explicitly to protect bona fide seniority systems in Title VII.
The purpose is to reinforce the conclusion, already stated, that
the solution is not to be found in repudiating seniority. Part II of
this Article argues that when seniority-based layoff causes past
discrimination to have a disproportionate impact on women and
minorities perpetuation of the present effects of past discrimina-
19 Work sharing as an alternative to layoff has been suggested by some writers, e.g.,
Blumrosen & Blumrosen, supra note 12; Note, Seniority, supra note 11, at 398-99; and by
government agencies, see EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 16. Except for the
Blumrosens' article, however, discussion of worksharing has been essentially peripheral
to what has been considered the main issue-whether layoffs by seniority violate Title
VII. To date no one has recognized that whether the court finds there is a violation
depends on whether the court sees a viable alternative, so that the question of liability
can be answered only after resolving the question of remedy.
Because the courts have refused to hold seniority provisions violative of Title VII
in layoff cases, civil rights advocates have felt compelled to turn to other methods of
avoiding the impact of "last hired, first fired." Speech by Vernon Jordan Jr., Executive
Director of the National Urban League to a convention of the AFL-CIO Industrial
Union Department, in 1 LAB. REL. REP. 90 LRR 103 (Sept. 22, 1975).
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tion can and should be remedied by Title VII. Part II also ar-
gues that work sharing is entirely consistent with remedial prin-
ciples worked out in ten years of litigation under Title VII and
with the purposes of the statute as expressed in its legislative
history. Part III explores some of the variations of work sharing,
its adaptability to different industrial settings, and the ability of
the courts to administer this remedy.
20
I. THE CASE FOR SENIORITY
Some critics of a "last hired, first fired" layoff system ex-
plicitly question whether seniority is worth preserving at all, par-
ticularly when measured against the need to foster minority
employment. 21 The difficulty with their arguments becomes ap-
parent when one asks what they would have replace it, for no
one has proposed a satisfactory substitute. On the other hand,
those who argue that the law supports continued reliance on
seniority as a basis for determining order of layoff rarely ex-
amine their legal conclusions in terms of the nature and function
of seniority. Few critics on either side of the debate have given
systematic attention to the considerations that lie behind the im-
portance assigned seniority in the legislative history of Title
VII,22 or have suggested how these considerations might guide a
20 The discussion of work sharing in this Article relates solely to-the private sector,
where the employer is faced with reduced demand for a particular product or service,
which reduces the need for labor. In the public sector the problem is quite different,
because the shortage is not in the demand for services but in budgeted funds to pay for
those services. Avoiding layoff in the public sector requires reduction in pay, with or
without reduction of work. The socially preferable solution, which is essentially the so-
lution favored by the public employer, is to maintain the same level of services but to re-
duce the labor costs of those services. Thus it has been suggested that public employees
should accept wage cuts or a wage freeze, absorb a greater share of pension and other
benefit costs, have holidays without pay, or even work days without pay. The fairness of
such measures is subject to serious question, for they place the whole economic burden
on the public employees while the taxpayers, as employers, get the same level of ser-
vices at a lower cost.
21 The conclusions reached in Note, Seniority, supra note 11, at 393, are typical: "If
the employer followed discriminatory hiring policies, then to some extent the white or
male employees as a group owe their seniority positions to these policies .... There-
fore, where there are discriminatory hiring policies in the background, seniority expec-
tations can be seen as not wholly legitimate. ... The district court's opinion in Wat-
kins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41
(5th Cir. 1975), noted that the plaintiffs in that case were not asking for "some sort of
.super seniority'" but instead were challenging "the validity of seniority itself as a basis
for allocating employment opportunities when the inevitable outcome of such a decision
would be to perpetuate a past discrimination in favor of white employees." 369 F. Supp.
at 1230 n.7.
22 The legislative history of § 703(h) of Tide VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970),
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court in tackling the problem of layoffs that have a
discriminatory impact. If we understand the function and im-
portance of seniority, we can better understand the significance
of the negative directives of sections 703(h) and (j), and the
courts' response to them.
Behind the explicit legislative approval of seniority in Title
VII stands the widely, almost uniformly, accepted industrial
practice of using length of service to determine various employ-
ment rights of employees.2 3 Seniority provisions are incorpo-
rated into more than ninety percent of all union contracts, 24 and
in more than seventy percent seniority is the sole or decisive
factor in determining order of layoff.25 Even in industries such
has been treated extensively in law review commentary. See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol,
Seniority and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of
Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1598, 1607-14 (1969); Poplin, supra note 11, at
189-94; Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966); Note,
Seniority, supra note 11, at 362-71; Harvard Note, supra note 11, at 1548-51; Note, Title
VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1260 (1967).
Courts have also had occasion to review the legislative history at length. See, e.g., Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 706-10 (3d Cir. 1975),
petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1975) (No. 75-182); Watkins v.
Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1227-28 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d
41 (5th Cir. 1975); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516-17 (E.D. Va.
1968). When Title VII was extensively amended in 1972, § 703(h) was left unchanged,
and the sponsors of the amendments said that "present case law as developed by the
courts would continue to govern [sections not affected by the amendments.]" 118 CONG.
REC. 7166 (1972) (section-by-section analysis of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972) (introduced by Senators Williams & Javits).
23 Seniority may be calculated on a plant-wide, job, or departmental basis for dif-
ferent purposes under the same contract; for example, promotion opportunities may
depend on job seniority, while order of layoff may be governed by length of employ-
ment service. Besides serving as the basis for a myriad of informal privileges on the
shop floor, seniority may be the determining factor in transfer rights, shift or vacation
preference, and scheduling days off. Many contracts provide for increased benefits,
such as longer vacations, with increased length of service.
For a discussion of seniority and its place in the value structure of the overall
employment relationship see S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY, & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 104-41 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
SLICHTER]; Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1962).
24 The most recent survey by the Bureau of National Affairs revealed that 92% of
all collective bargaining agreements contain seniority provisions, with the major excep-
tions occuring in the longshore, construction, and apparel industries. 58 BNA DAILY
LAB. REP. B-I (March 25, 1975). In the first two industries, however, union seniority
generally influences employment opportunities by determining the order of referral
from hiring halls for available work. See generally U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-11, SENIORITY IN PROMOTION AND TRANSFER
PROVISIONS (March, 1970).
15 U.S. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS, LAYOFF, REHIRING AND
WORK-SHARING § 60:1 (1975). See generally U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF
LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-14, ADMINISTRATION OF SENIORITY (1972); BLS, LAYOFF, supra
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as construction and longshore, where short-term employment
makes use of seniority impractical, 26 priorities in job referrals
may depend on the worker's length of service in the union or
industry. Seniority is not solely a product of union pressure;
both public and private employers who are not bound by col-
lective agreements commonly rely to some degree on length
of service in making decisions on promotions, transfers, and
layoffs.
The legislative approval of seniority in section 703(h) of
Title VII might be viewed as no more than recognition of an
existing social institution, but there still would remain the ques-
tion why that institution exists and whether it is worth preserv-
ing. Widespread reliance on seniority when choices between em-
ployees must be made has its roots in fairly persuasive practical
considerations.
First, seniority protects against arbitrariness. When choices
must be made as to which employees will get the preferred shift,
be promoted, or be laid off, there is always the danger and the
greater fear that the person making that decision will act out of
personal favoritism or spite, or without full and fair considera-
tion. Seniority represents a simple, precise, and objective stan-
dard which provides employees "a degree of independence from
the whims or personal preferences of supervisory officers. ' 7
It provides employees a basis for predicting their future em-
ployment status and a device for protecting that status. Unions
have pressed for seniority provisions to protect workers from ar-
bitrariness by management; and management has accepted
seniority because it has recognized that those making the deci-
sions may at times be arbitrary and that arbitrariness is costly
in terms of maintaining plant morale and retaining valu-
able employees.
note 14. Seniority for layoff purposes is usually calculated on an employment service
basis, rather than on the length of service in a given job or department. Most contracts
contain provisions for "bumping" rights, which may be exercised in a variety of ways to
permit employees with greater employment seniority to replace junior workers in other
jobs and thus to withstand layoff; plant location and job qualifications often limit these
rights. Similarly, many contracts include generous retraining provisions for senior em-
ployees. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-7, TRAIN-
ING AND RETRAINING PROVISIONS 18-19 (March, 1969).
26 Of 385 agreements in the construction industry analyzed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics in 1972, only 30 contained seniority provisions. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-14, ADMINISTRATION OF SENIORITY 32
(1972).
21 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 22, at 1604 (footnote omitted).
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Second, seniority is easy to administer. When a choice must
be made among employees, seniority provides a simple and
reasonable test which will supply a definite answer. From the
employer's standpoint, it avoids grievances which require review
of judgment; from the union's standpoint, it avoids internal dis-
putes about which employee is most deserving. From the stand-
point of both top management and top union officials, the appli-
cation of seniority at the operating level is simple to oversee and,
on balance, economical to administer.
Third, seniority enables an employee to acquire valuable
interests by his work, to capitalize his labor and obtain something
more than a day's wages for his continued production. When
seniority determines promotion rights, it gives the employee a
claim to better jobs when they become available; when seniority
determines the order of layoff, it provides the employee a mea-
sure of insurance against unemployment. Seniority does not
guarantee that vacancies in higher rated jobs will be filled or that
any jobs will be available; but by giving the senior employee
priority when a choice is made as to who will be promoted or
who will remain employed, seniority gives an employee an in-
terest of substantial practical value. As Professor Aaron has
pointed out, "[m]ore than any other provision of the collective
agreement . . . seniority affects the economic security of the
individual covered by its terms, '28 and it has understandably
come to be viewed as one of the most highly prized possessions
of any employee. Seniority may be the most valuable capital asset
of an employee of long service.
In legal terms seniority "owes its very existence to the collec-
tive agreement" 29 and theoretically can be modified or bargained
away by the union and employer, subject only to the union's duty
of fair representation."0 However, because of the strong sense
that seniority rights are earned rights belonging to the em-
ployees, those rights are seldom significantly changed by bar-
gaining.
3'
28 Aaron, supra note 23, at 1535.
29 Id. 1534. Seniority expectations under a collective bargaining contract have been
held subject to judicial modification on public policy grounds in cases where a seniority
system is found to be unlawful under Title VII because it was adopted with an intent to
discriminate. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 415 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted, 420 U.S. 989 (1975). See also United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Quarles v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
30 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
31 A significant exception arises in the plant merger situation, over which there has
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Seniority has thus assumed an importance to the employee
and to the community of which he is a part well beyond what-
ever legal status it may derive from the collective agreement. It is
both the symbol and the realization of a worker's expectations,
expectations reinforced by a sense of rightness of the basic prin-
ciple of length of service. It is the functional expression of a
community expectation which, if it does not insist that seniority
be immutable, at least assumes that earned rights will not be
divested absent a compelling cause. That expectation assumes
fair treatment by the union, to which control of seniority rights is
committed, and protection by the courts in the event earned
rights are unfairly denied.
The very prevalance of seniority and the expectations it has
created adds a fourth, and perhaps most important, practical
reason for its continued recognition as an ordering principle.
Rejection of the principle of seniority where a seniority system
has been established would be disruptive and demoralizing to
the work force, for it would be viewed as depriving employees of
rights earned in accordance with a just principle.
It should be kept in mind that seniority as an ordering prin-
ciple is not a principle that determines when a choice between
employees is to be made, or requires the making of an unneces-
sary choice. The decision that a choice is to be made-to fill a
vacancy, make a transfer, make overtime work available, or re-
duce the number of employees-is governed by other rules, or
by management discretion. 2 All that seniority as an ordering
been much litigation. For a discussion of the issues and the cases see Kahn, Seniority
Problems in Business Mergers, 8 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 361 (1955); Comment, Post-Vaca
Standards of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation: Consolidating Bargaining Units, 19 VILL.
L. REV. 885 (1974).
32 This management choice may be limited somewhat by provisions in collective
bargaining agreements. For example, about 10% of collective agreements contain
"guaranteed work" clauses requiring employers not to reduce the work week beyond
that point specified in the contract. Some arbitrators have found an implied prohibition
against reduction in the work week when the last hired, first fired clause is accom-
panied by a provision that the regular work week shall be forty hours, or five days of
eight hours. Morris Machine Works, 40 Lab. Arb. 456 (1963) (Williams, Arbitrator);
Lime Materials Indus., 35 Lab. Arb. 936 (1960) (Eckhardt, Arbitrator); Cook Mach.
Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 845 (1960) (Boles, Arbitrator); Motch & Merryweather Mach. Co., 32
Lab. Arb. 492 (1960) (Kates, Arbitrator); Kennecott Copper Corp., 32 Lab. Arb. (1960)
(Schedler, Arbitrator); International Harvester Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 311 (1955) (Cole, Ar-
bitrator). The weight of opinion and the trend, however, seem to be to refuse to imply
such a limitation on the scheduling of work and to uphold work sharing in the absence
of some explicit contractual prohibition. Industrial Garment Mfg. Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 875
(1975) (Hall, Arbitrator); Lear Siegler, Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. 984 (1972) (Edelman, Arbi-
trator); Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. 852 (1969) (Murphy, Arbitrator); Jessop Steel
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principle requires is that length of service be determinative when
choices are in fact made.
Because seniority is an ordering principle, the core of
seniority rights is the expectation that the order will be observed
when choices between employees are made. To disregard the
order of seniority by giving priority to a junior over a senior
worker will be viewed as taking rights away from one person and
giving them to another. The value of the right and the insistence
on following the order of seniority strictly vary greatly, however,
depending on the particular employment right that seniority is
ordering. When overtime is distributed by seniority the right is
to the first opportunity for extra earnings, a right that may have
only occasional and limited value, during peak production
periods, and a right that some employees choose not to exercise.
When shift preferences are determined by seniority, the right
may have personal rather than monetary value, and that value
may be quite limited for many employees. In promotions the
question is who shall have prior right to a better job, a matter of
substantial and continuing consequence both as to earnings and
desirability of the job.
In a layoff situation, however, seniority takes on an impor-
tance of a wholly different order, for it determines who shall
continue to work and who shall not. That determination neces-
sarily carries with it all the other employment rights ordered by
seniority-overtime, shift preferences, promotions, and the rest.
In addition, layoff may jeopardize or destroy other valuable
rights attached to employment or accumulated by long service.
Layoff may result in termination of group medical or life insur-
ance which the employee can not afford to continue individually.
If the layoff continues long enough to terminate seniority the
employee may lose the longer vacations, accumulated sick leave,
longevity pay, and perhaps even pension benefits, earned by
length of service. When employees are confronted with mass
layoffs, the symbolic and real importance of seniority is most
Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 556 (1968) (Teple, Arbitrator); Patent Button Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 877,
(1961) (Stouffer, Arbitrator); Struthers Wells Corp., 34 Lab. Arb. 372 (1959) (May,
Arbitrator); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 610 (1959) (Gamser, Arbi-
trator); Blaw-Knox Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 874 (1955) (Ebeling, Arbitrator). But see A. Hoen
& Co., 64 Lab. Arb. 197 (1975) (Feldesman, Arbitrator), in which the arbitrator ruled
that in light of the employer's past lay-off practices, the institution of work sharing
violated the contract. The arbitrator suggested, however, that if work sharing had been
instituted to prevent layoff of minorities or women it might not have been a violation of
the contract.
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compelling; deviation from the order of seniority is viewed as
repudiation of a "vested right." It deprives the senior employee
not only of his security but of all other values he has earned by
his length of service.
In enforcing the provisions of Title VII relating to seniority,
the courts have exercised considerable discretion in devising
remedies to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination. In an
expansionist economic setting the problems presented were ones
of promotion or referral, rather than layoff. Potential conflict
between the expectations of incumbent white workers and the
rights of those groups previously denied full employment oppor-
tunity could be glossed over or minimized.33 The most an in-
cumbent white employee generally lost was the certainty or
probability of proniotion or referral at a time he might otherwise
have anticipated it. But when the challenge to seniority threatens
to take away the very job an employee now holds, and to which
his years of service purport to give him certain entitlement over
others, the expectations created by seniority are entirely de-
stroyed. The security against unemployment that he had earned
is given to another.
When we give weight to the congressional judgment ex-
pressed in section 703(h) that seniority serves a useful social
purpose and represents values worth preserving; when we iden-
tify the purposes and values on which that congressional judg-
ment rests; and when we recognize that rejecting seniority in
layoffs cuts to the heart of those purposes and values; then we
can better understand why the courts uphold the use of seniority
to determine layoffs even though it operates to the disadvantage
of women and minorities because of past hiring practices.
By the same token, we should have misgivings about a posi-
tion that rejects the principle of seniority and effectively abro-
gates the system itself, particularly when there is a possible alter-
33 This apppears to have been particularly true in cases involving seniority in union
hiring hall referral systems, in which the usual remedy permitted minority workers to
bump into the referral line ahead of majority union members; an abundance of avail-
able work for all may well have been an important factor in quieting potential charges
of reverse discrimination. For example, in Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler,
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969), the court noted that the union had, by its discriminatory
membership policies, contributed substantially to a critical shortage of skilled labor in
the area by "intentionally" limiting its membership to about 25% of what could have
been absorbed. Id. at 1051. But see United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 11 FEP
Gas. 787 (9th Cir. 1975), in which the court of appeals instructed the trial court on
remand to take into account the effect of its order on the seniority rights of non-
minority employees. See also Stacy, supra note 11, at 496-97.
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native which would preserve the principle of seniority without
perpetuating the effects of past discrimination, by avoiding the
layoff and the necessity of choosing who shall work and who
shall not.
II. THE LIMITS AND POTENTIAL OF TITLE VII
A. The Dilemma of Rights and Remedies in
Layoff Cases
In order to understand why the precedents developed in the
promotion and referral cases have not been extended to the
layoff cases, and how such precedents are applicable to work
sharing, it is necessary to state more explicitly the dilemma that
courts confront when application of the "last hired, first fired"
rule is challenged in layoff cases.
In promotion cases the courts have repeatedly and force-
fully asserted that Title VII prohibits employment practices that
perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.34 In the words of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: "Full enjoyment of
Title VII rights sometimes requires that the court remedy the
present effects of past discrimination .... If the present senior-
ity system in fact operates to lock in the effects of past discrimi-
nation, it is subject to judicial alteration under Title VII. ' 35
The principle was stated in even broader terms in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,3 6 in which hiring and promotion to jobs previ-
ously held only by white employees was conditioned on posses-
sion of a high school diploma or passing two intelligence tests.
Because of its discriminatory impact of disqualifying a dispor-
portionate number of black employees, this practice was de-
clared illegal: "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.
' 3 7
31 See, e.g., U.S. v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), petitionfor cert.
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1975) (No. 75-672); United States v. N.L. Indus.,
Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d
418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Papermak ers Local 189 v. United States, 416
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
's United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 927 (5th Cir. 1973).
36 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
37
Id. at 430.
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If this broadly stated principle is accepted at face value and
followed single-mindedly to its logical conclusion, as the district
court in Watkins did, 38 then layoff by seniority must be pro-
hibited whenever past hiring discrimination has prevented
minorities and women from acquiring sufficient seniority to
withstand layoffs as well as their white or male counterparts.
This broad principle cannot be followed single-mindedly, how-
ever, because it is not the only mandate directing a court on this
question. Alongside and limiting it are three other principles,
two articulated in the statute and one articulated by the courts.
First, section 703(h) of Title VI 39 expressly states that it
shall not be unlawful to apply different privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a "bona fide" seniority system.40 Congress
thereby made clear its approval of seniority as an ordering prin-
ciple for determining employment rights. By its use of the qual-
ifying term "bona fide," Congress indicated that it did not in-
tend to immunize seniority systems per se from judicial scrutiny,
nor to insulate entirely all seniority expectations of majority
workers. 41 But Congress certainly did not intend to invalidate
per se all seniority rights where there had been prior discrimina-
tion in hiring. That would be the consequence of single-
mindedly applying the principle that a seniority system cannot
perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. Past discrimination
in hiring minorities inevitably results in postponement of their
seniority dates, and those seniority dates determine in perpetuity
their relative rights to promotions, overtime, transfers, con-
tinued employment, the length of their vacations, the amount of
their pensions, and a myriad of other rights and privileges. Em-
3 Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd,
516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); see text accompanying notes 2-5 supra.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
4 See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
41 See cases cited note 34 supra. In United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451
F.2d 418, 455 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972), the court explicitly
recognized that the kind of relief it ordered often "proves detrimental to whites' com-
petitive seniority status, and consequently to their transfer and promotion expecta-
tions." In United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973), Judge Matthes said that if the relief granted
works to frustrate the seniority expectations of some incumbent [employees], it
will only be frustrating expectations which would not exist but for the dis-
crimination which is finally being redressed .... In the final analysis, allega-
tions of reverse discrimination contend only that the hardships accruing from
past wrongs should continue to fall exclusively upon those already discrimi-
nated against. The answer to that contention is self-evident.
464 F.2d at 312 (Matthes, J., concurring).
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ployees are affected constantly by their seniority date through-
out the course of their employment. The effects of past hiring
discrimination are perpetuated to some extent unless use of the
seniority principle is barred entirely when minorities are in-
volved. This the courts have been unwilling to do in the face of
section 703(h).
Second, section 703(j) 42 expressly states that nothing in
the Act shall be interpreted to require any employer to grant
preferential treatment to any minority individual or group on
account of an imbalance between minority and non-minority
employees. 43 The courts have not read this provision as barring
them from requiring employers to give preferences to minorities
in promotions or hirings to fill vacancies to offset the effects of
past discrimination, 44 but the courts have read the provision as
barring them from ordering the employer to displace incum-
bent majority employees to give their positions to minority
employees. 45 The layoff situation does not permit this distinction
between filling vacancies and displacing incumbents. If a court
orders the junior minority employee retained, the senior major-
ity employee will be displaced and the minority employee, in
effect, will be given the majority employee's job. Displacement, if
permanent, takes away the whole value earned by the senior
employee by his long service. He loses all possiblity of promo-
tion, all extended vacation benefits, accumulated sick leave, and
perhaps some or all of his pension.
42 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(0) (1970).
43 See note 9 supra.
44 United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972).
4- "Qualified negroes with greater seniority can not displace incumbent workers.
However, they are to be given a preference for future vacant jobs absent a compelling
business reason." Id. at 118. The principle that incumbent workers may not be dis-
placed is central to the so-called "rightful place" theory. See Papermakers Local 189 v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Note,
supra note 22, at 1268.
This general limitation on the remedy applies only when the employment practice
attacked is nondiscriminatory on its face and in its intent and is illegal only because it
perpetuates the effect of past discrimination. When the practice attacked is discrimina-
tory in itself the remedy can and normally should make the plaintiff whole, by placing
the employee where he would have been but for the present discrimination.
The remedial provisions of Tide VII are modeled after those of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 419 & n.11 (1975). Under the NLRA, an employee who is discriminatorily
denied employment because of an employer's anti-union sentiment can be ordered em-
ployed with full retroactive benefits. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,
187-89 (1941). An order of reinstatement may, and usually does, include both back pay
and seniority calculated as if the discriminatory firing had not occurred. Corning Glass
Works v. NLRB, 118 F.2d 625, 629 (2d Cir. 1941).
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Third, even in cases involving employers with a past history
of discrimination, the courts have refused to enjoin employment
practices which are nondiscriminatory on their face and in their
intent but which have a disparate impact, if the practice is jus-
tified by "business necessity. '46 To meet this test the employer
must show that there are "no acceptable alternative policies" by
which he can accomplish his business purpose "with a lesser dif-
ferential racial impact. '47 Use of seniority in layoffs can be jus-
tified under the business necessity test if there are no acceptable
alternatives that will provide an appropriate, objective standard
for making choices between employees and will preserve the
employees' earned rights.
Other objective standards which may not have the same dis-
criminatory impact as seniority can be found to determine who
shall work and who shall not, for example, age, number of de-
pendents, or length of residence in the community. 48 Those to
be laid off might even be chosen by lot. Such devices would be
totally unacceptable, however, because the sense of rightness of
the seniority principle is too deeply embedded in our industrial
society; the results of such devices would not be tolerable in
layoff situations. Any one or all of such standards could allow a
recently hired employee to continue to work while an employee
of long service was put out on the street. Nor would such stan-
dards serve the affirmative purpose of remedying the effects of
past discrimination, for the criteria would apply equally to ma-
jorities and minorities.
The objective standard of a quota could be used, as was
attempted by the district court in the Watkins case,49 laying off
proportionate numbers of majority and minority employees in
accordance with their seniority within their respective groups.
46 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); United States v. N.L.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1973); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457
F.2d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249
(10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Papermakers Local 189 v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
47 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971) (citation omitted). See generally Comment, Business Necessity under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974). The de-
gree of necessity has been described as a "compelling business necessity," United States
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1107 (1973), and as one that "connotes an irresistible demand," United States v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
4' See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 22, at 1635-36.
49 Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd,
516 F.2d. 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
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But this requires creating, in effect, segregated seniority lists
ordering the displacement of employees on the basis of race or
sex. Apart from the nearly insuperable obstacle posed by section
703(j), such a method of choosing who shall work and who shall
not would generate a deep sense of unfairness. Majority em-
ployees who would bear the burden of such quotas would in-
clude those who were hired after discriminatory hiring policies
had ended and who obtained their jobs in fair competition with
minority applicants, while more senior majority employees who
had benefited from past discriminatory hiring might be unaf-
fected. At the same time, the minority employees who would
benefit are those who were hired more recently and may have
entered the labor market after the discriminatory hiring policy
ended. To the extent that seniority serves to bring a sense of
fairness among employees to the workplace, this purpose is un-
dermined by the use of quotas.
In the layoff cases the courts of appeals have manifested an
awareness of the conflict between the broad principle that em-
ployment practices should not be allowed to perpetuate the ef-
fects of past discrimination and the limiting principles of sec-
tions 703(h) and (j) and the business necessity rule. That conflict
has been resolved in layoff cases by refusing to enjoin the use
of seniority systems that are neutral on their face and in their
intent. In Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW,
50
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged that
the seniority system perpetuated the effects of past hiring dis-
crimination, but declared: "Congress, while recognizing that a
bona fide seniority system might well perpetuate past dis-
criminatory practices, nevertheless chose between upsetting all
collective bargaining agreements with such provisions and per-
mitting them despite the perpetuating effect that they might
have. '51 Permeating the court's opinion is its concern that any
remedy it might devise would contravene sections 703(h) and (j)
by creating "fictional seniority" or requiring "reverse discrim-
ination," thereby destroying the stabilizing values of the se-
niority principle. "Congress did not intend the chaotic conse-
quences that would result from declaring unlawful all seniority
so 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), petition for cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Aug. 1,
1975) (No. 75-182).
51 508 F.2d at 706.
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systems which may disadvantage females and minority group
persons .... "52
The court of appeals in Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 236953
had before it the district court's attempt to devise an alternative
to the "last hired, first fired" rule. The court of appeals saw in
the remedy ordered displacement of senior white incumbents by
junior blacks and establishment of a quota system based on ra-
cially segregated seniority lists. This ran too directly against sec-
tions 703(h) and (j). In addition, the court of appeals saw junior
black employees who had not even reached the age of employ-
ment when the employer ended its discriminatory hiring policies
displacing senior white employees who had not been responsible
for, and may not have benefited from, that discrimination.
Rather than confront the conflicting principles, as the Third
Circuit in Jersey Central had done, the Fifth Circuit seized upon
the specific facts of the case and declared that because none of
the plaintiffs themselves could have been victims of the com-
pany's discrimination, no perpetuation of past hiring discrimina-
tion could be found as to them.54
5 2 Id. at 708.
53 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'g 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974).
54 In promotion cases, relief has been limited to those who could have been victims
of past discrimination. Employees hired after the employer has ceased the practice of
hiring into segregated lines of progression, or after he removed the barriers to transfer,
are not "affected employees" covered by the remedial orders; they are not given the
right to bid on vacancies across seniority unit lines. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc.,
517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1975)
(No. 75-672); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 657 n.4 (2d Cir. 1971). The
"affected employees," however, do include all who could have been victims of past dis-
crimination. To be an "affected employee," it is not necessary to show that the minority
employee would have been hired or assigned to a different line of progression but for
the discrimination, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra; United States v. Cen-
tral Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971); nor to show that he would
have bid on a vacancy in a different line of progression but for the discrimination,
United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 11 FEP Cas. 787 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra. Indeed, employees have been included in the
protected class even though there may be substantial reasons for believing that they
would not have sought promotion or would not have had better qualifications than
other applicants. Palmer v. General Mills, Inc., 513 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1975); Rod-
riguez v. East Texas Motor Freight Co., 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971). It is not necessary to show
actual individual discrimination; it is enough to show that but for past discriminatory
practices the employee might have bid or applied for the position and been so assigned.
If the present seniority system could have the effect of disadvantaging some minority
employee who had been discriminated against, then it is treated as perpetuating the
effects of past discrimination as to all who possibly could have been discriminated
against.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:893
The Seventh Circuit in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works55 was
less thoughtful and less subtle. It sought to deny the existence of
the problem by asserting what was palpably untrue-that "the
'last hired, first fired' principle does not of itself perpetuate past
discrimination"-but then betrayed its reason for denying the
obvious: "To hold otherwise would be tantamount to shackling
white employees with a burden of a past discrimination created
not by them but by their employer.
56
Emerging from these cases is the courts' clear acceptance of
the principle that employment practices that perpetuate the ef-
fects of past discrimination run counter to the purposes of the
Act and should be remedied. The remedy, however, must not do
violence to the limiting principles of sections 703(h) and (j), and
must meet the test of business necessity by providing a suitable
alternative. The determination that an employment practice vio-
lates the statute and the finding of an appropriate remedy are
but opposite sides of the same coin, the coin of business neces-
sity. If the court cannot find a suitable alternative, then it cannot
Following this rationale in a layoff case, a last hired, first fired seniority rule will
disadvantage any minority employee who might have applied for a job and been hired
at an earlier date, but for the past discrimination. As to all such employees, the senior-
ity system perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. In the Watkins case the court of
appeals found, however, that the plaintiffs were too young to have applied for a job at
the earlier date, when they might have been discriminated against. These plaintiffs
were, therefore, in the same position as white workers hired contemporaneously and
those minority employees in the promotion cases who were hired after the employer's
discriminatory practices had ended. See Poplin, supra note 11, at 225-30. Despite the
court's obvious reluctance to challenge the last hired, first fired rule, it reserved the
question of the rights of the minority employees who could show that their failure to
obtain earlier employment was because of exclusion of minority employees from the
work force. Relying on this express reservation, a district court in the Fifth Circuit has
granted relief against a last hired, first fired rule in the case of an employer who only
recently had abandoned his discriminatory practices. Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Local
759, United Rubber Workers, 11 FEP Cas. 703 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
For a proposal to construct a remedy in layoff cases by recomputing individual
seniority dates on the basis of when an individual minority employee could have been
hired, but for past hiring discrimination, see Harvard Note, supra note 11. For a flat
rejection of the rationale that the "affected class" entitled to protection is limited to
those who could have been victims of the employer's past discrimination, see Blumrosen
& Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 1103-04. For the Blumrosens it would be enough that
the plaintiffs be members of the racial, ethnic, or sexual class previously discriminated
against.
One obvious problem with the personalized theory is that it provides an employer
desirous of keeping its seniority system intact an incentive for preferring young black
job applicants over older ones, thus further tipping the scales against individuals who
may in fact have been victims of the employer's past discrimination.
55 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb.
24, 1975) (No. 74-1064).
56 502 F.2d at 1320.
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determine that the employer's practice fails to meet the test of
business necessity and therefore violates Title VII. Once it is
shown that an employment practice perpetuates the effect of
past discrimination, the inquiry necessarily focuses on whether
there is a suitable alternative to that practice which the court can
appropriately order.
The courts have been unable to find a suitable alternative to
the "last hired, first fired" rule for determining the order of
layoff. When choices are made to determine who shall work and
who shall not, all of the values of seniority are at stake; to abro-
gate the order of layoff defeats not only the employees' expecta-
tions of continued employment but all of their expectations of
accrued values in vacations, pensions, and other benefits which
increase with length of service. The courts quite understandably
have been unwilling to destroy those expectations and values,
particularly in the face of section 703(h), when they have no
suitable alternative ordering principle. Unable to develop a satis-
factory remedy, the courts have felt compelled to find that there
has been no violation.
B. "Suitable" Remedies in Promotion and
Job Referral Cases
1. The Promotion Cases
In promotion cases the courts are also confronted with a
clash between the broad principle that employment practices,
though neutral on their face and in their intent, cannot be
allowed to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination, and the
three limiting principles of sections 703(h) and (j)57 and the busi-
ness necessity test.58 But because the discriminatory impact
grows out of the special structure of seniority used, rather than
the use of the seniority principle itself, and because promotion
rather than layoff is involved, the courts are able to devise suit-
able alternatives.
57 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) & 0) (1970). The courts reconciled the invalidation of
seniority systems, neutral on their face and in their intent, with § 703(h) by reasoning
that Congress intended to immunize only "employment seniority" and not departmental
seniority. See Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 994-95 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505,
516 (E.D. Va. 1968). The distinction between a departmental seniority system and an
employment seniority system has no support in the legislative history. See Note Seniority,
supra note 11, at 365.5 8 See generally notes 39-47 supra & accompanying text.
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In the promotion cases the original discrimination consists
of creating segregated departments and lines of progression,
with blacks denied original employment in, or later promotion
into, "white" departments and lines of progression. Even though
discrimination in hiring and transfer have been eliminated, re-
tention of the old departmental or line of progression seniority
has the effect of continuing to bar senior black employees from
the better "white" jobs, because to be eligible for those jobs, the
black employees have to go to the bottom of the white progres-
sion line. The remedy ordered by the courts generally includes
permitting black employees to bid on vacancies in the formerly
white lines on the basis of employment rather than departmental
seniority, allowing transfer with full employment seniority and
wage rate retention and the right to return to one's former posi-
tion if the transfer does not work out, and requiring the em-
ployer to provide training to enable black employees to fill jobs
commensurate with their employment seniority.
59
Certain characteristics of the remedy should be noted, for
they underline distinctions between the promotion and layoff
cases. First, the remedy does not reject but affirms the principle
of seniority. The instrument of discrimination is the special form
of departmental or line of progression of seniority; the remedial
alternative that replaces it is employment seniority, which pro-
vides an objective ordering principle which is responsive to the
sense that rights should depend on length of service and which is
not disruptive of other benefits that accrue with length of ser-
vice.
Second, the remedy does encroach on the expectations
created by the existing seniority system. Employees in the white
line of progression who expected, because of their departmental
seniority, to fill vacancies in better jobs, find blacks from other
departments filling those vacancies, so that expected promotions
are delayed. But the encroachment is a limited one. No em-
ployee is displaced from a present job, because employment
seniority can be used only to fill vacancies, not to bump incum-
bents out of jobs; and no employee is put on the street or de-
prived of other rights accumulated by length of service.
60
59 See Gardner, The Development of the Substantive Principles of Title VII Law: The
Defendant's View, 26 ALA. L. REv. 1, 19-42 (1973); Stacy, supra note 1I, at 499-502.
60 United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., II FEP Cas. 787 (9th Cir. 1975);
Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971). In certain circumstances this prin-
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Third, the present effects of past discrimination are not en-
tirely eradicated. A black employee who was in a dead-end line
of progression because of past discrimination is not entitled to
claim ajob that he would have occupied "but for" the discrimina-
tion, if that job is already filled. He has to continue in his dead-
end job until a vacancy that he is qualified to fill occurs in a
white line, and that vacancy may well be a less desirable job than
one then held by a white employee with less employment senior-
ity. Furthermore, the black employee is given only one oppor-
tunity to use employment seniority to bid into another line of
progression, because this provides him a chance to take his
"rightful place"61 while preventing the plant from being thrown
into a "chaotic game of musical chairs.
62
Although the theory used by the courts is termed the "right-
ful place" theory,63 it does not always guarantee the employee
his rightful place but frequently perpetuates in some measure
the effects of past discrimination. It could more accurately be
entitled the "escape hatch" theory, because the courts' concern is
that the minority employee not be locked into the status quo but
rather that he have an opportunity to share in available promo-
tions in the future.
Fourth, although the remedy is limited by the business
necessity test, it still places a substantial burden on the employer.
No employee is entitled to a job he cannot perform properly,
regardless of seniority, but employers can be required to provide
training programs to substitute for the training an employee
would obtain in the line of progression,64 and to pay a "red
ciple may not be as immutable as it seems. What constitutes a "vacancy" may itself be
uncertain when nonminority employees are on layoff and the jobs they previously held
become available again and are to be filled by recalling laid-off workers. See Williamson
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971); Pop-
lin, supra note 11, at 208-12; Stacy, supra note 11, at 502-05.
61 United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 117 (5th Cir. 1972).
62 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 1971).
63 The theory originated in Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent
Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1260 (1967), was enshrined in the judicial lexicon by Judge
Wisdom in his opinion in Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), and still remains the talismanic term. See,
e.g., United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 11 FEP Cas. 787 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for
cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1975) (No. 75-672).
64 U.S. v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517.F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1975) (No. 75-672); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495
F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 989 (1975).
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circle" rate when an employee bids into the line on a job that
pays a lower rate than his former job.6" The employer cannot
meet the test of business necessity by showing bad past experi-
ence with transfers, 66 morale problems of employees, 67 or union
threats to strike. 8
As noted above, the remedy ordered in the promotion cases
does not wholly avoid perpetuating the effects of past discrimi-
nation, nor does it wholly avoid encroaching on expectations
created by the seniority system or giving preference on the basis
of race. By substituting employment seniority for departmental
seniority, however, and by limiting application of the new senior-
ity to future vacancies, the courts can utilize an alternative that
significantly alleviates the effects of past discrimination, pre-
serves seniority as an ordering principle along with its central
core of values, causes a limited encroachment on expectations,
and imposes a limited burden on the employer who is, after all,
responsible for the past discrimination.
2. The Job Referral Cases
In the job referral cases,69 in which unions operating hiring
halls discriminate in admission to membership or referral to
jobs, the clash of principles is less easy to reconcile. But those
cases do not pose problems of the same dimension as layoff
cases. If a court orders a union operating a hiring hall to admit
members or to refer workers to jobs on a nondiscriminatory
basis, it is simply ordering equal opportunity for future jobs. If a
court orders a union to credit minorities for work experience
outside the union when it refers workers on the basis of work
experience, the remedy is substantially equivalent to replacing
departmental seniority with employment seniority.
70
65 Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 375-76 (8th Cir. 1973).
66 Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249-50 (10th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
6 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971).
68 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 44 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971).
69 E.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F.
Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971); United States v. Plumbers Local 73, 2 FEP Cas. 81 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
70 United States v. Plumbers Local 73, 2 FEP Cas. 81 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
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The more difficult problem arises when a court orders a
union to observe specified quotas for admission to membership,
acceptance into apprenticeship programs, or referral to jobs.7'
The primary clash is with section 703(j),7 2 which the courts have
brushed aside with surprising ease. 73 If the number of workers
ordered by the court admitted to membership or to the referral
list is no greater than the demand in the relevant industry can
bear, the expectations and job opportunities of those previously
employed will not be affected. 4 Whatever the court's order in a
referral case, it will lack two crucial elements present in the
layoff cases. First, the order will not displace an incumbent from
a job presently held, but will at most affect opportunities to
obtain other jobs in the future.7 5 More importantly, seniority
normally plays a much less significant role in hiring hall em-
ployment than in other employment, so the court order will be
less disruptive of expectations and vested rights.
C. Work Sharing as a "Suitable" Alternative to Layoff
The precedents in the layoff and promotion cases support
the use of work sharing as a remedy when layoffs on the basis of
seniority would have a disproportionate adverse impact on mi-
nority group employees or women because past discrimination in
hiring had relegated them to vulnerable positions on the senior-
ity list.
Employment practices that perpetuate the effects of past
discrimination, even though they are neutral on their face and in
their intent, are prima facie violations of Title VII. Such prac-
tices will be enjoined if remedies are available that conform to
the limiting principles of sections 703(h) and (j) and meet the
71 Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) (membership and
apprenticeship); United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973)
(issuance of work permits); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d
123 (8th Cir. 1969); Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th
Cir. 1969) (membership); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202
(W.D. Wash. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
7' See Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1053-54 (5th Cir.
1969); note 33 supra.
74 See Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
7' See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra. The effect of requiring the union to
admit additional minority workers into membership or to add minority workers to the
referral list will be to impose on the regularly employed non-minority workers a form
of work sharing with the minority workers. See Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236
(5th Cir. 1971).
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business necessity test of providing a suitable alternative. Be-
cause laying off on a "last hired, first fired" basis inevitably per-
petuates the effects of past hiring discrimination, it should be
enjoined if a suitable alternative is available.
The underlying business condition causing an employer to
contemplate layoff is a lack of enough work to keep all of his
employees fully employed. His first employment decision is
whether to reduce the number of hours his employees work or
to reduce the number of employees working. Only if he decides
to reduce the number of employees rather than the number of
hours is he confronted with the question of the order of layoff.
The layoff cases make quite plain that when there has been past
hiring discrimination, there is no method of ordering layoff that
will not frustrate one or another of the purposes of the statute,
either by perpetuating the effects of past discrimination or by
defeating the values of seniority which Congress sought to pre-
serve by section 703(h).
Because there is no suitable method of ordering layoff in
such cases we are forced to focus on the antecedent decision to
lay off; it is that decision which results in giving present effect to
past hiring discrimination. When we focus on the antecedent
decision to lay off, the question is whether the decision to reduce
the number of employees was required by business necessity, or
whether reducing the number of hours each employee worked
would be a suitable alternative. This is the legal question that the
decisions in the layoff cases fail to pose, much less to answer.
Work sharing, that is, reducing the number of hours each
employee works, presents none of the forbidding problems as-
sociated with layoff. It eliminates the present effects of past hir-
ing discrimination by having all employees share equally in work
opportunities regardless of whether they were victims or ben-
eficiaries of past discrimination. Because it avoids layoff, it
avoids any need to recompute seniority or create "fictional" se-
niority. The principle of seniority as a method of making
choices between employees is left intact because work sharing
lets the employer avoid the need to make a choice; no junior
employee moves ahead of or displaces a senior employee be-
cause all employees continue to work on the jobs to which their
seniority entitles them.
Work sharing does encroach on the expectation of some
senior employees that they will continue to work full-time even
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when work becomes slack.76 To the extent that their hours are
reduced, that expectation is disappointed. In all other respects
all the other values earned by length of service are preserved,
because all employees remain employed and are able to exercise
their seniority for purposes of promotion, transfer, shift prefer-
ence, and other priorities, and can continue to enjoy the longer
vacations, accumulated sick leave, increased pensions, and other
benefits earned by past service. Work sharing's limited en-
croachment on expectations cannot be said, in light of the
promotion cases, to be barred by the general endorsement of
seniority in section 703(h).
The only substantial legal question posed by work sharing is
whether requiring an employer to reduce the number of hours
rather than the number of employees imposes such an added
burden on him that it cannot be considered a suitable alterna-
tive under the "business necessity" test. The practicalities of vari-
ous forms of work sharing will be explored in the next section,
'77
but two basic propositions should be emphasized here. First,
under the business necessity test, the burden should be on the
employer to show there is no suitable alternative to the employ-
ment practice that has the discriminatory impact. The employer
must persuade the court that no form of work sharing proposed
by the plaintiff is a viable alternative. 8 Second, the business
necessity test is not met by the employer's showing that the alter-
native imposes some added costs. In promotion cases the reme-
dial costs are often substantial in terms of administrative burden,
extra wages, training expenses, and lowered efficiency. To im-
pose a substantial burden on the employer is not to penalize an
innocent party, because it is the employer's past discrimination
76 That expectation is not necessarily justified, because a contractual provision that
layoffs shall be by inverse order of seniority only governs the order of layoff and not
whether there shall be a layoff at all rather than a reduction in hours of work. Arbi-
trators are divided on the issue, but this seems to be the weight and trend of opinion.
Only when the seniority clause is accompanied by other provisions and practices do
artibrators find an implied prohibition of work sharing. Note 32 supra & accompanying
text. If the contract contains a so-called "guaranteed work week" clause, then the expec-
tation is justified; but many such clauses expressly permit limited work sharing by allow-
ing reduction of the work week to 32 hours.
7 Text accompanying notes 86-140 infra.
,8 Although the issue has not been completely resolved, the best approach would
impose on the plaintiff the burden of going forward by proposing a reasonable alterna-
tive; but then the burden of persuasion would shift to the employer to demonstrate that
the suggested alternative would be unworkable or too costly in proportion to the
layoff's impact on minority employees. See Comment, supra note 47, at 113-14.
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that necessitates seeking an alternative employment practice
which will not perpetuate the effects of the employer's wrongful
conduct.
The usefulness of focusing on the employers' decision to
reduce the number of employees as the statutory violation,
rather than on the use of seniority to implement that decision
can be illustrated by examining the three layoff cases recently
decided by the courts of appeals. In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 79 the employer engaged in a series of layoffs and rehires.
Beginning in the fall of 1964, thirty bricklayers were laid off in
what the company described as a "fundamental change" in the
steelmaking process. During the next year, however, the com-
pany found that it had "underestimated" its bricklayer require-
ments and began recalling those it had laid off. By March of
1967 nearly all had been recalled. Two months later some em-
ployees, including the plaintiff, were laid off again in a "tem-
porary reduction," and in August the plaintiff was recalled. Be-
cause layoffs and recalls were by seniority, a disproportionate
burden of the shortage of work fell on minority employees.
The court raised no question about the propriety of the em-
ployer's practice of laying off and recalling employees as pros-
pects of available work changed; it did not require the em-
ployer to demonstrate that such a "yo-yo" staffing practice was
a business necessity. If the court had asked the proper question,
it might well have discovered that this management practice had
no substantial justification, and that business needs could have
been accommodated as well by adjusting the number of hours
bricklayers worked. Because the court failed to ask this question,
the answer to which might have provided the basis for an ap-
propriate remedy, it was presented with the subsequent question
of the order of layoff, which it could not answer in a way that
would protect minority employees. The court found that the
employer's past hiring discrimination now placed it in a "racially
precarious position"80 but never asked whether it was necessary
for the employer to place himself in that position. Because the
court was unable to find any alternative to seniority for deter-
mining the order of layoff, it permitted the employer to per-
petuate the effects of his past hiring discrimination. The proper
79 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb.
24, 1075) (No. 74-1064).
80 502 F.2d at 1321.
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and answerable question for the court was whether the layoff
was necessary, not whether seniority was necessary for ordering
an unnecessary layoff.
In Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW,81 the
company decided to lay off four hundred out of four thousand
employees because of "economic considerations." The company
sought a declaratory judgment as to its obligations under two
contracts, one a collective agreement with the union requiring
layoff by seniority and the other a conciliation agreement with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission committing the
employer to increase the number of women and minorities in its
work force. Although layoff by seniority would have a dispro-
portionate impact on minorities, the court declared that the con-
tract did not conflict with the conciliation agreement because by
its literal terms the conciliation agreement related only to hiring
new employees and did not reach layoffs. The court also found
no conflict with Title VII because the seniority system, being
neutral on its face and in its intent, was "bona fide." The court's
conclusion was to permit the employer to proceed with layoffs
which wiped out all the gains in minority employment achieved
by compliance with the statute and the conciliation agreement.
The court reached the wrong answer because it asked the wrong
question-whether the seniority system was bona fide. The an-
tecedent question that should have been asked was whether the
employment practice of laying off employees rather than sharing
the work violated both the conciliation agreement and the statute
when its inevitable consequence, given the seniority rule, was to
decrease the number of minority employees in the work force.
Declaring the seniority rule bona fide in no way validated
the decision to reduce the number of employees when the alter-
native of reducing the number of hours was available. The court
failed to require the employer to present evidence that work
sharing was not a suitable alternative, even though work sharing
would have fulfilled the purposes of the conciliation agreement
without any significant encroachment on the seniority provision
of the collective agreement. There was no reason to believe that
some form of work sharing could not have been devised which
would have been suitable for the business of the employer.
81 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Aug. 1,
1975) (No. 75-182).
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Watkins v. United Steel Workers Local 236982 presents a more
difficult fact situation for devising an alternative to layoff. The
number of employees at Consolidated Can's Harvey plant was
reduced from 410 to 152 in two years and there was little pros-
pect of substantial recall. Sharing the work available at the Har-
vey plant among all Harvey employees would most likely have
been impractical. Such an arrangement would not have been the
only possible alternative, however, because Harvey was not Con-
solidated Can's only plant, and an inquiry could have been di-
rected toward the possibility of distributing work from the other
plants rather than displacing workers at one plant. To prove the
business necessity for such massive layoffs at Harvey, 83 the com-
pany could have been required to show whether similar layoffs
occurred at other plants making similar products, whether the
shifting of production from other plants to Harvey would have
been practical, and whether Harvey employees could have been
transferred to other plants. It may have been that there was no
practical alternative to mass layoffs at Harvey; but the district
court never requested such proof. Instead, the court tried to
protect the gains in minority employment by reordering layoffs
with quotas drawn from separate black and white seniority lists.
8 4
The court of appeals properly rejected this drastic answer,8 5 but
never asked the right question-whether there was a business
necessity for laying off workers at the Harvey plant without pro-
viding them an opportunity to transfer to other plants. The
82 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); see text
accompanying notes 1-10 supra.
83 This assumes that there was a prima facie violation of the statute. As pointed out
at note 54 supra & accompanying text, the age of the plaintiffs foreclosed them from
being possible victims of past discrimination; the employer's use of seniority for layoff
therefore did not perpetuate any past discrimination as to them.
84 There were intimations that the court was going to adopt a broader approach to
remedy in Judge Cassibry's opinion of January 14 stating that the company might
"utilize a larger work force, possibly with some reduction in working hours, until nor-
mal attrition reduces the work force to its most efficient level," and that "the primary
burden for correcting the discrimination [should be placed on the] Company, rather
than a few white employees .... " 369 F. Supp. at 1232. However, in the subsequent
order of May 14, 1974, 8 FEP Cas. 729 (E.D. La. 1974), the court adopted the narrower
quota approach, which had also been mentioned in the January 14 opinion, 369 F.
Supp. at 1232. Had the district court order been upheld, the consequence would have
been that the white workers would have had to bear the full brunt of their employer's
prior discrimination by losing seniority rights. White workers would have been
penalized under the court's remedy by having to sacrifice recall rights as well. 8 FEP
Cas. at 731.
85 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
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court of appeals allowed the company to perpetuate the effects
of its past hiring discrimination and deprive minority employees
of their gains under the statute, without placing the burden of
proving the absence of a suitable alternative on the company.
III. PRACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF WORK
SHARING AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO LAYOFF
In the previous sections of this Article we have argued that
when a proposed layoff would have a disproportionately heavy
impact on women or minority employees because of the em-
ployer's past hiring discrimination, the decision to lay off must
meet the test of business necessity. The burden should be on the
employer to show that there is no suitable alternative, and alter-
natives can be deemed suitable even though they may impose
some added costs on the employer.
The purpose of this section is to explore some of the various
alternatives that may be available, their usefulness and their
costs, and also whether the courts are competent (in the sense of
appropriateness and ability) to impose such remedies. Admit-
tedly, the exploration here can only be preliminary, because the
devices and variations on them that may be invented under the
pressure of judicial action can not be foreseen; nor can the full
impact of such devices be measured short of their application to
concrete cases. Preliminary exploration, however, may at least
serve to foster further consideration of the possibilities and
problems.
A. Devices Short of Work Sharing
When an employer is confronted with the need to reduce
the number of labor-hours worked, there are a number of de-
vices which avoid layoff by seniority86 and work sharing,87 which
86 Under many collective agreements temporary layoffs, which may stem from
minor inventory adjustments, customer cancellations, breakdowns, or emergencies
beyond the control of management, need not be in reverse order of seniority. The
length of such layoffs is strictly limited, however, often to thirty days or less, and tem-
porary layoffs cannot be used to avoid permanent layoffs in situations of a long-term
reduction in the required labor force. BLS, LAYOFF, supra note 14, at 43.
87 Restrictions on overtime might be viewed as a form of mandatory work sharing,
because they require reduction of the work week to forty hours for all employees be-
fore employees of low seniority can be laid off. Restrictions on overtime, to avoid or
minimize layoffs during slow periods, were found in 7% of the BLS sample, most of
them in machinery (except electrical), primary metals, and apparel industries. Id. 8. In
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can be, and often are, used. Reduction in the work force may be
achieved by natural attrition, through quits, discharge for cause,
retirement, or death. Some contracts require the use of attri-
tion8" or limitations on new hiring, 9 rather than layoffs, when
reductions are necessary. Attrition may be accelerated by en-
couraging early retirement through supplemental pension pay-
ments.
Employees may also be encouraged to take voluntary layoffs
by the existence of supplemental unemployment benefit (SUB)
plans.90 Some Auto Workers contracts provide an option for
voluntary layoff in reverse order of seniority because SUB pay-
ments guarantee virtually full salary for those of long seniority. 91
Some senior employees so covered may prefer layoff to place-
ment in comparatively undesirable or low-paying jobs.
contrast, only 2% of the major agreements studied by BLS for the 1954-55 period
contained such restrictions. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL.
No. 1209 ANALYSIS OF LAYOFF, RECALL AND WORKSHARING PROVISIONS IN UNION
CONTRACTS 7 (March, 1957). It is not clear whether the employer's interest in being
able to schedule overtime or the employees' interest in being able to work it has been
the more important factor in the apparent disinclination to limit it. It may be significant
that the Executive Committee of the AFL-CIO, at its meeting in February, 1975, urged
Congress to require double time for all overtime work as part of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), "not to increase individual earnings but
to reduce unemployment." The Committee noted that employers continue to schedule
overtime while laying off workers "because they find it less costly." 88 LAB. REL. REP.
156. The Committee also called for restrictions on new hires, a 35-hour week to pro-
vide more jobs, and additional benefits for workers on layoff.
s Although attrition clauses are relatively common in the railroad industry, only a
few contracts in the BLS survey contained such clauses, and they were generally limited
to protect only very senior employees. BLS, LAYOFF, supra note 14, at 18, 19.
89 Thirty-five percent of the contracts in the BLS sample limited or prohibited hir-
ing during slack or layoff periods. The majority of such clauses were limited to situa-
tions of actual layoffs. Id. 11-13.
90 Supplemental unemployment benefit (SUB) plans are designed to provide weekly
supplements to state unemployment insurance benefits. Most plans include benefits for
partial unemployment. Many SUB plans also provide moving allowances, separation
pay, and health insurance coverage. As of 1963 there were 174 separate SUB plans in
operation, covering 1.9 million workers, or about 25% of workers covered by major
agreements. These plans are concentrated in the metal and transportation equipment
industries. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-3,
SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT PLANS AND WAGE-EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEES 4
(June, 1965). The attractiveness of voluntary layoffs has been considerably reduced, at
least in some companies, by the exhaustion of SUB funds. See 98 BLS MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 57 (July, 1975).
9' The 1970 United Auto Workers contract with the Deere Company provides that
those with ten or more years of seniority may elect to be laid off first, and that they will
not be recalled until their SUB benefits expire. In Bales v. General Motors Corp., 9
FEP Cas. 234 (N.D. Cal. 1975), the court denied injunctive relief from a layoff in part
because of the plaintiffs' failure to establish that "irreparable injury" would result from
the layoff: Under the UAW-negotiated SUB plan the laid-off employees were to receive
"approximately 95% of their takehome pay." Id. at 235.
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These devices of accelerated attrition or induced voluntary
layoffs help protect recently hired minorities and women from
involuntary layoff, but they are probably not alternatives that the
courts could order. The costs of the supplemental pensions and
supplemental unemployment benefits are so substantial that the
necessary funds must be accumulated over a long period of time
as a part of the general wage package. Under the business neces-
sity test, the burden on the employer would be greater than he
could be required to bear.
Collective agreements also commonly restrict subcontracting
when employees are laid off.92 Where these restrictions exist the
courts could require that they be followed to protect the jobs of
recently hired minorities. A court could, on its own, impose such
a restriction to avoid layoff when it would be practical for the
employer to undertake the work, and the burden would be on
the employer to show that subcontracting was a business neces-
sity.
Where reductions in force are required in one of the
employer's departments or plants, but vacancies exist in other
departments or plants, many collective agreements require that
employees be allowed to transfer and often provide for retrain-
ing periods to enable laid-off employees to fill those jobs. 93
There would seem to be no reason why a court could not order
such transfers and even retraining in appropriate cases to avoid
layoffs that would perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.
The burden on the employer would be no more, and perhaps
even less, than the burden imposed on employers in promotion
cases who have to pay "red circle" rates to transferred employees
and to provide them with training programs. For purposes of
devising a remedy, the employer's entire enterprise, rather than
the single department or plant, is the relevant entity.9 4
Although some of the devices short of work sharing, par-
ticularly interdepartmental and interplant transfers, may ap-
propriately be ordered by the courts as alternatives to layoff,
their reach is obviously limited. They are wholly inadequate to
protect the employment gains of minorities against substantial
reductions in force.
"2 BLS, LAYOFF, supra note 14, at 9-10.
93 Nearly a third of the 1,845 agreements in the BLS sample contained clauses
specifically requiring an employer to transfer or consider transferring employees to
open jobs as an alternative to layoff. Some provided a training period for employees
who might not be qualified for the job at time of transfer. Id. 17-18.
"4 See note 117 infra.
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B. Work Sharing
Work sharing is not a novel notion in American industry,
but is one of the traditional methods of coping with reductions
in available work.95 Although its appeal has declined because of
unemployment insurance and other income supplements avail-
able to laid-off employees,96 collective agreements continue to
contain provisions for distributing available work, particularly in
highly seasonal and piece-work industries where layoffs might
otherwise be a recurring fact of life.
97
Work sharing devices developed by industrial practice or by
collective bargaining take a variety of forms adapted to the par-
ticular needs of the industry, the production process, and the
enterprise. In industries such as the garment, leather, and textile
industries, where piecework systems emphasize units produced
rather than hours of work, collective agreements provide for
distribution of available work as a substitute for layoff.9 8 All
employees are thereby assured of a share of the work during
slack periods. In other industries, the most common form of
work sharing is reduction in the hours per shift or the number
95 In 1941, Sumner Slichter reported that of 388 agreements negotiated between
1923 and 1929, 28% had provisions calling for the application of seniority and 6% had
provisions calling for equal division of work in the event of a need to lay off. S.
SLICHTER, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 104-05 (1941) [hereinafter
cited as UNION POLICIES]. Of 400 agreements negotiated between 1933 and 1939, 42%
included provisions calling for the application of seniority, and 11% called for equal
division of work. Id. 106-07. Slichter noted the large proportion of contracts that con-
tained no restrictions on layoff and the great increase in such provisions during and
after the depression. He believed that the greater frequency of seniority restrictions
than work sharing provisions was attributable to the absence from his sample of agree-
ments from the needle trades and to the prevalence of "informal arrangements ... to
divide the work down to a certain point even where the agreement provides for layoff
only through seniority. Consequently, [he concluded] it is safe to say that the equal-
division-of-work principle is far more prevalent than these tables seem to indicate." Id.
104.
96 The "share-the-work" principle has less ready acceptance, especially among
junior employees, who reason that a 32-hour week provides little more remun-
eration than state unemployment compensation plus negotiated supplementary
benefits during a layoff. Some employees doubt whether it is worth working
four days a week for only slightly more than they would receive if they did no
work at all.
Similarly, senior employees question the wisdom of sharing work with their
juniors when the latter can get a reasonable good week's pay without work-
ing.
SLICHTER, supra note 23, at 152-53.
91 The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported in 1972 that just under 25% of the
contracts in their sample, (which covered 36% of the work force) contained provisions
for work sharing. BLS, LAYOFF, supra note 14, at 3.
98 Id. 6-7.
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of shifts per week. Contractual provisions for such reductions
are most common in the primary metals, communications, and
transportation equipment industries.9 9 This form of work shar-
ing, however, may not be workable in continuous process opera-
tions, or in service industries where the hours of operation de-
pend on customer demand. Where business and production
needs preclude division of work or reduction of hours, work can
be shared by rotation of employment, with employees sharing,
through rotation, the job slots to be filled. Provisions for such
rotation are less common in collective agreements, 100 but em-
ployers have had substantial experience with rotation, used by
itself and in conjunction with other devices.
The fact that these various work sharing devices have been
institutionalized by collective agreements is evidence that at least
some unions and employers find them preferable to layoff. Ex-
perience with these provisions also provides the courts with some
guidance as to the range and practicality of various work sharing
devices as alternatives to layoff. Before analyzing the acceptabil-
ity of these devices and the burdens they may place on em-
ployers and employees, it is necessary for purposes of compari-
son to call attention to some of the burdens of layoff according
to seniority, apart from the hardship imposed on those laid off.
It is against these costs of layoff that courts must measure the
suitability of work sharing as an alternative when layoffs impose
the added social costs of wiping out minority gains in employ-
ment.
If an employer decides to lay off a certain proportion of his
work force because of cutbacks in production he cannot, under
most seniority provisions, lay off the least senior employee in
each job classification or on each operation, leaving his work
force otherwise undisturbed. Instead, he must lay off those with
the lowest company, plant, or divisional seniority without regard
99 Reduction in hours clauses are by far the most common of the various work
sharing devices, appearing three times as often as other methods in the BLS study.
Id. 3.
Reduction in hours clauses generally limit the level and duration of the reduction.
Thirty-two hours is the most common minimum below which reductions may not go
without either further consultation with the union or layoffs. Of the 347 agreements in
the BLS sample that referred to reduced hours, more than a third limited the number
of weeks the reduction could continue. Id. 4-5.
100 Only about 5% of the agreements containing work sharing provisions provided
for rotation of employment, and it sometimes appeared as an optional procedure, al-
ternative to reduction in hours or layoff. Id. 8.
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to the job slots needed to be filled. This sets off a chain reaction
of employee transfers from one job to another until the needed
job slots are filled in accordance with seniority. 10' The number
of transfers may outnumber the number of layoffs several times
over. Even though employees may be able to exercise seniority
only to claim jobs that they have previously performed or for
which they are "qualified," their productivity will suffer for at
least a time; reconstituted work groups will have to develop pat-
terns of cooperation; and the whole production process will suf-
fer a measure of disruption. When employees are recalled the
problem of transfer, readjustment to jobs, and disruption are
repeated. For the employer, a layoff according to seniority can
be a complex and costly process.
Layoffs also impose burdens on many of those employees
who are not laid off. Those who are required to transfer nor-
mally find themselves in lower paying, less desirable jobs which
they must learn or relearn. Those who are near the bottom of
the seniority list of remaining employees after the layoff feel the
impending threat that soon they, too, may be on the street.
It is against this background of costs of layoff that the suita-
bility of work sharing as an alternative under the business neces-
sity test must be measured. For purposes of analysis it is useful to
divide work sharing devices into two broad categories-those
which share by reducing the employees' work week, either by
division of work, shortening the work day, or reducing the days
worked per week; and those which rotate employment on a
weekly, monthly, or longer time period.
1. Reducing the Work Week
For the employer, there can be advantages in reducing the
work week rather than laying off employees, because certain
overhead costs may be reduced by having the plant open only six
hours a day or four days a week. The added cost to the em-
ployer, which is common to all work sharing devices, is that he
will be burdened with labor costs that relate to employees as
individuals and not to the hours they work or the work they
perform. Thus the costs of group medical and life insurance,
and in some cases holiday pay, vacation pay, and accumulation
101 For a glimpse into the complexity of seniority provisions, see U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-14, ADMINISTRATION OF SENIORITY
(1972).
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of sick leave, will remain the same regardless of whether an
employee works thirty or forty hours each week.10 2 The em-
ployer's obligation to cover these costs could be proportioned to
the average hours worked per week, but few collective agree-
ments do so. These added costs are relatively insubstantial, how-
ever, and should not ordinarily amount to a business necessity
justification when layoffs would have a disproportionate impact
on minority group employees. In such cases the burden is more
appropriately placed on the employer, whose past discrimina-
tion is the source of the problem, than on the employees. If the
court believed the costs to be substantial, at least holiday pay,
vacation pay, and sick leave accumulation could be ordered
adjusted in proportion to the work week.
The major objection to reduced work weeks comes not from
the employer but from the employees, because none of the wage
loss is made up by unemployment compensation. Under most
state laws no unemployment benefits are paid for any week in
which a person works three days or more.'0 3 The result is that
the total income of the work group from wages and unemploy-
ment benefits is less if all employees work a reduced week than if
some work full time and some are laid off. This loss to the group
of employees results in a saving to the employer, because his
unemployment insurance rates are generally tied to the amount
of benefits collected by his employees. In some cases unions have
resisted reduced work weeks initiated by an employer on the
ground that the employer was trying to save unemployment in-
surance premiums at their expense.'
0 4
102 With respect to employees earning more than $15,000 a year and working full-
time, there may also be some added costs in Social Security taxes if work is shared for a
substantial portion of the year.
103 All state unemployment benefit programs, with the exception of Montana's, ex-
tend to partial unemployment, but only when "underemployment" reaches a certain
stage. Few states allow the employee to collect more in wages and benefits, however,
than what would otherwise be the maximum weekly benefits for total unemployment.
See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAws 3-41
(rev. ed. Jan. 1975). Montana treats anyone who works fewer than 12 hours a week as
totally unemployed. Id. 3-42.
14 See, e.g., Statement of the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) in
Opposition to Government Mandated Work-Sharing (Memorandum from Paul Jennings,
IUE President, to all local IUE unions, March 31, 1975). The IUE Executive Committee
"vigorously opposes" the notion that "the goal of equal opportunity in employment
should be achieved by requiring that employees share the available work and pay rather
than [by the government's] creating more jobs." Work sharing is said to "victimize the
innocent employee" and "benefit the wrongdoer" employer by lowering employee ben-
efits, unemployment compensation contributions, overtime payments, and cost of turn-
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This objection to reducing the work week could be over-
come by redefining benefit rights when partial unemployment is
a result of work sharing. It has been argued that employees who
agree to share the burden of unemployment should be entitled
to share the unemployment benefit that would have been due
had some been laid off.'0 5 Thus if five employees share four jobs
to avoid having one laid off, the five should share the amount
of one full unemployment benefit. There would seem to be no
authority for a federal court in a Title VII case to order state
unemployment systems to pay such benefits to make work shar-
ing a more suitable remedy, but federal legislation could impose
this requirement as a minimum standard for an approved state
unemployment system.
1 6
The reduced work week has another disadvantage from the
viewpoint of the employees because it may not give them useful
added time in which to take a temporary or part-time job to
replace lost income, nor may it provide the time or incentive for
employees to search for other full-time jobs. Against these disad-
vantages for the employees, the reduced work week offers the
advantage of avoiding the hardships of total unemployment such
over. The memorandum stresses that the IUE does not oppose work sharing per se, but
only government-mandated work sharing.
Union opposition to work sharing is in part a product of internal political forces.
Senior employees who will remain on the job during a slack period outnumber junior
employees who will not.
Moreover, rotating layoffs agreed to by the employees, or by the union on their
behalf, may be treated by some states as voluntary quits without good cause, disqualify-
ing employees from benefits. See Department of Labor and Indus. v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review (Appeal of Lybarger), 418 Pa. 471, 211 A.2d 463 (1965)
(employees laid off in work sharing plan denied benefits); Blakeslee v. Administrator,
25 Conn. Supp. 290, 203 A.2d 119 (Super. Ct. 1964) (employees agreeing to two-
weeks-on, one-week-off schedule rather than layoff denied benefits for the week off);
O'Donnell v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 53 Del. 162, 166 A.2d 720
(Super. Ct. 1961) (employee, held to have voluntarily surrendered job in intra-union
bumping agreement, denied benefits). Other states have interpreted "voluntary" more
generously in terms of the underlying economic forces affecting the employees' willing-
ness to go on layoff. See Employment Security Comm'n v. Doughty, 13 Ariz. App. 494,
478 P.2d 109 (Ct. App. 1970) (divorced claimant did not terminate employment volun-
tarily by electing to permit married son with children to retain sole employment when
business had to lay off all but one employee) (dictum); Larson v. Michigan Employment
Security Comm'n, 2 Mich. App. 540, 140 N.W. 2d 777 (Ct. App. 1966) (because
economic pressures motivated voluntary agreement to quit, benefits awarded).
105 Wettick, Modifying Unemployment Compensation Acts to Remove Obstacles to
Work-Sharing, 15 LAB. L.J. 702 (1964).
1'06 The Internal Revenue Code levies a payroll tax on employers and then grants a
credit of up to 90% against the tax to employers who contribute to an unemployment
fund under a "certified" state unemployment compensation act. A state law is certified
only if it meets specified standards as to entitlement to benefits. Federal Unemployment
Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-05 (1970).
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as limited payments from unemployment insurance and lack of
medical insurance coverage.1
0 7
This leads to an additional legal uncertainty. From the
standpoint of the employer, the reduced work week would seem
to be a suitable alternative to layoff within the "business neces-
sity" test. Under the present unemployment insurance structure
in most states, the reduced work week might even give the em-
ployer a substantial net financial gain. The primary burden
would be on the group of employees because they would have
reduced earnings without compensation from unemployment
benefits. Until now, the business necessity test has focused on the
costs to the employer, not to the employees as a group. No cases
have discussed whether an employer can reject an alternative
because of its prospective burden on his employees.
It would seem that an employer should be able to assert an
interest in the welfare of his employees, whether that interest is
prompted by economic or humane considerations. More impor-
tantly, the union should be able to object to an alternative it
considers unsuitable because of the burden it places on the
employees, because the union has a right to bargain about the
choice of alternatives and any court order would circumscribe
the choices for which the union could bargain. The court
should surely consider the costs to the employees as a group,
therefore, in determining the suitability of a proposed alterna-
tive to layoff. A union could reasonably argue that a reduced
work week was not a suitable alternative to layoff because the
loss of unemployment benefits in the amount that would have
been paid to those laid off would be too substantial. 108
Because the employees' loss of unemployment benefits gives
the employer a windfall in contributions he does not have to
make, the employer could properly be required to distribute that
107 At least some employee groups have judged these advantages to be significant.
In December, 1974, employees at the Washington Star agreed voluntarily to a four-day
week at a 20% salary reduction as an alternative to layoffs; any fifth-day employment
was to be paid on a straight-time basis and rotated. 98 BLS MONTHLY LAB. REV. 86
(Feb., 1975). In May, 1975, the Telephone Traffic Union agreed to a similar proposal
from the New York Telephone Company, as an alternative to laying off 400 operators.
N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
108 Unemployment compensation benefits are determined on the basis of a percent-
age of weekly wages earned, commonly 50-60% during a given prior period which
varies from state to state. A maximum weekly benefit is established, in most states be-
tween $95 and $100. Seventeen states have a maximum amount of more than $100 a
week, and six of more than $120, including allowance for. dependents. lB CCH UN-
EMPLOYMENT INS. REP. 3001.
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windfall to those of his employees who are placed on a reduced
work week. Even so, some burden will remain on the employees,
particularly if the use of a reduced work week lasts for an ex-
tended period.
2. Rotating Employment
Instead of reducing the work week, the employer can re-
duce the number of full-time jobs, as if he were to order a layoff,
but rotate the employees filling those jobs. If, for example, an
employer needed to cut back production twenty percent, he
could schedule one-fifth of the employees to be off each week in
rotation so that each employee would be off one week out of
every five. This device can be used in continuous process opera-
tions, service industries, and other situations in which produc-
tion and business needs make the reduced work week impracti-
cal.
Such job rotation on a weekly basis has a significant advan-
tage over the reduced work week in not depriving the employee
group of unemployment benefits. In most states an employee is
entitled to benefits for any week in which he is totally unem-
ployed, so that during the week an employee was scheduled off
he would receive a full week's benefits. 109 In a regular layoff a
constant one-fifth of the employees would receive benefits
each week; in a rotating layoff a different fifth of the employ-
ees would receive benefits each week. The employees' benefits
would not be barred by the common requirement of a one-week
waiting period, because after an employee has served the waiting
period once, during the following twelve months he is entitled to
benefits for the first week of any period of unemployment.1 0
Job rotation would reduce the total amount of unemploy-
ment benefits for the group only to the extent that the waiting
week would apply to all employees rather than to only one-fifth
of them. But the employee group would gain if the cutback
extended over a long period, because their benefits would never
be exhausted. Long before any employee had received twenty-
six benefit payments, his continued employement would requal-
l09 Even rotating layoffs may be treated by some states as voluntary quits which
disqualify employees from receiving benefits if the employees, or the union on their
behalf, agree to the rotation. 1B CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INS. REP. 1910 (1971); see
generally note 104 supra.
110 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS
3-5, 3-6 (rev. ed. Jan. 1975).
TITLE VII REMEDIES IN RECESSION
ify him for additional weeks of benefits."' On the other side, the
employer would gain from the increased number of waiting
weeks at the outset, but if the cutback extended more than
twenty-six weeks he would lose because of additional charges
against his account." 2 The differences between a regular layoff
and a rotating layoff in terms of unemployment benefits and
costs are relatively small, however."13 Those differences would
not seem to be sufficiently substantial to meet the "business
necessity" test so as to justify the insistence of the employer or
the union on using a regular layoff rather than rotating em-
ployment when rotation would avoid perpetuating the effects of
past discrimination.
There are other considerations to recommend rotation. Al-
though it reduces the number of employees working at one time,
it avoids the chain of employee transfers to different jobs and
enables the employer to retain the same ratio of skills in his work
force. For the employees, a full week off every four, five, or six
weeks would give them more usable free time than reduced
work weeks. Supplemented by unemployments benefits for that
week, the reduction in income will, for most, be more manage-
able.
3. Periodic Shutdowns
A total shutdown of operations for one or more weeks at a
time has the same effect in terms of sharing the work as a rotat-
"I1 To qualify for benefits, an employee must work a minimum number of weeks
or earn a minimum amount of wages in the preceding calendar year, but the minimum
is commonly less than 30 weeks of work or less than half the regular earnings. 1B CCH
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. REP. 1960, 3001. Therefore, an employee who was off one
week out of three would continually requalify for benefits. See generally G. ROCHE,
ENTITLEMENT TO UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 29-47 (1973).
,12 Although employees may be entitled to extended benefits during periods of
recession for up to 39 additional weeks, the employer's account or merit rating is not
charged beyond the basic 26 weeks. Emergency Compensation and Special Unemploy-
ment Assistance Extension Act of 1975, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 (Supp. Oct. 1975). See
generally, M. MURRAY, THE DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 27-68 (1974).
113 This would be true in most states that use "reserve ratio" or "individual ac-
count" methods of merit rating, in which the employer's contribution rate is based on
the amount paid out to his account for laid-off employees. In some states such as Con-
necticut, however, in which the employer's contribution rate is based on "compensable
separations," a rotating layoff would multiply the number of compensable separations.
This would result in an increase in contributions by employers who would not otherwise
be paying at the maximum rate. lB CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INS. REP. 1120. In most
cases in which the employer's cutback -was substantial enough to require use of a rotat-
ing layoff, however, his contribution rate would probably be pushed up to the max-
imum by a seniority layoff.
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ing layoff. Depending on production needs, operations can be
totally shut down every third, fourth, fifth, or sixth week. The
consequences for unemployment benefits will be the same as
with a rotating layoff; no employee will receive benefits for the
first week, but all will receive benefits for subsequent weeks, of
the shutdown. Periodic shutdowns may involve a reduction in
fixed overhead costs and for that reason may be more accept-
able, from the employer's point of view, than some of the work
sharing devices discussed above.
4. Summary
Devices for avoiding layoff have been sketched in only their
simplest forms; they are capable of nearly infinite variations and
combinations. When cutbacks in production become necessary,
some portion may be absorbed by early retirement or by layoff
by reverse seniority to take advantage of supplemental employ-
ment benefits. An additional amount may be absorbed by reduc-
ing the work week, and a further amount by rotating employ-
ment or shutting down periodically. Different departments or
operations can use different combinations of devices to meet
particular production needs or employee desires. The devices
need not be applied uniformly throughout the plant; they can be
applied only to those departments or operations that would
otherwise be affected by a layoff. On the other hand, work shar-
ing can be distributed beyond departmental or even plant
boundaries to the extent that employees or production pro-
cesses are transferable.
C. The Limits of Work Sharing
At least in theory, work sharing devices can be used as a
substitute for layoff, regardless of how extensive the layoff might
be. If the cutback were fifty percent, for example, reducing the
work day to four hours would be intolerable in most circum-
stances for the employer and employees alike. Reducing the
work week to two or three days might be practical for the em-
ployer but intolerable for the employees, whose earnings and
partial unemployment benefits would amount to no more than
what they would receive if they did not work at all. A schedule
on which all employees were to work full force every other week,
however, or on which the employees were to rotate on jobs every
other week, maintaining plant operations at half force, might be
tolerable for the employer and acceptable to the employees as an
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alternative to massive layoffs. Cutbacks even beyond fifty per-
cent could probably be absorbed by work sharing.
There are limits, however, beyond which work sharing may
not be practical for the employer or tolerable for the employees,
particularly for extended periods. Those limits cannot be clearly
delineated, because the employer's added costs of maintaining a
large number of part-time employees on the payroll, and the
consequences to employees of being tied to a part-time job, vary
according to industrial and business operations and the general
employment situation. Some collective agreements expressly re-
quire work sharing until the work week is reduced to thirty-two
hours, a reduction of twenty-five percent."14 Reduction beyond
one-third, even with a rotation system, would seem in most situa-
tions to raise substantial objections from both employers and
employees.
In considering the limits of work sharing, it is necessary to
remember the continuing impact of attrition through death, re-
tirement, and voluntary quits. As work sharing becomes more
substantial, attrition will increase as employees on reduced in-
come become more willing to retire and more energetic in seek-
ing jobs that will provide full-time employment. Even when the
cutback is permanent, the need for substantial work sharing may
be relatively short term.
D. The Competence of the Courts to
Design the Remedy.
Section 706(g) 1 5 of the statute "give[s] the courts wide dis-
cretion [in] exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most
complete relief possible."' 16 If a court finds that work sharing is
a suitable alternative to layoff by seniority that perpetuates past
hiring discrimination, there is ample statutory authority for the
court to impose it as a remedy." 7 The question is whether the
114 Note 99 supra.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973), amending id. (1970).
116 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (section-by-section analysis of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972) (introduced by Senators Williams & Javits).
117 The language of § 7 06(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973), amending id.
(1970), tracks and expands upon § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1970). Under the National Labor Relations Act employers have been ordered
to reemploy employees laid off as a result of subcontracting, Fibreboard Paper Prod.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); to cease reducing stocks of merchandise and
otherwise causing the business to decline and to offer reinstatement to former em-
ployees, Stiffler Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 218 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1975); to offer
employees jobs in other plants, Arnold Graphics Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 257
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court is competent, in practical terms, to design and administer a
remedy that reaches into the employer's business decisions by
ordering him to distribute the available work among his em-
ployees rather than to lay some of them off.
In ordering work sharing the court's intervention in the
employer's business decisions is limited. The employer remains
completely free to decide the level of production or service he
will maintain, the number of labor hours required to achieve
that level, and the mixture of skills or tasks that will most effi-
ciently achieve it. Work sharing does not require an employer to
assign any employee to a job the employee has not previously
performed, or to which he would not be entitled under the
seniority provisions of the collective agreement; nor does work
sharing require the employer to pay any employee other than
the regular rate for the job he performs. Work sharing only
restricts the employer's freedom to decide how many different
employees will be used to provide the necessary labor, that is,
among how many employees the amount of work the employer
wants performed will be distributed; and he has available to him
a variety of devices which he may use to accommodate his busi-
ness needs.
Against this limited judicial intervention should be con-
trasted the extensive judicial involvement in the promotion cases
under Title VII. 118 In promotion cases the courts must prescribe
the conditions under which employees in one line of progression
can bid into another line of progression, 119 how many times they
can exercise that right,120 the job level at which they can bid into
the other line, 12 1 and the conditions under which an employer
can return employees to their original jobs. 122 If the job in the
other line pays at a lower rate than the original job, the employer
(6th Cir. 1974); Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1023 (1969); to pay employees' expenses of moving to other plants, Royal
Norton Mfg. Co., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1971); Bermuda Knitwear Corp., 120 N.L.R.B.
332 (1958); and to reinstate employees laid off discriminatorily in a production cutback,
NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co., 474 F.2d 1155 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823
(1973).
118 For a discussion of the extent of judicial intervention evidenced by the remedies
awarded in the promotion cases, see Gardner, supra note 59.
'9 United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532, 560-66 (W.D.N.C.
1971).
120 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 1971).
121 United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 117-19 (5th Cir. 1972).
122 United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 459 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
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is required to pay the employee his former rate, which may be
substantially higher than the regular rate for the job
performed. 123 The court must also prescribe the length of time,
or "residence," the employee must occupy in one job before
being allowed to bid on a higher job in the progression, 124 and
decide which jobs in the progression are functionally related and
which steps can be skipped.125 After determining promotion
rights, the court must prescribe bumping and recall rights when
there is a reduction in force and recall of laid off employees, and
this may present problems even more complex than the
promotions. 26
The courts in the promotion cases break down established
departmental seniority systems, imposing or substituting plant-
wide seniority rulqs of their own design. 127 In addition, the
courts have ordered special compensatory training programs,
specifying which employees are entitled to what kind of training
at what time to enable them to qualify for their "rightful
place."'
28
In the hiring hall cases, court intervention has penetrated
even more deeply into internal union processes and the job re-
ferral procedures established by collective agreements. 129 Unions
have been ordered to admit to full membership minority work-
ers who do not meet the admission requirements of the union
constitution and to develop objective trade-related standards for
admission to the union.' 30 Unions have also been ordered to
122 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 327 F. Supp. 1034, 1044 (E.D. Va. 1971);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 3 FEP Cas. 129, 130 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
124 United States v. Papermakers Local 189, 301 F. Supp. 906, 918, 920 (E.D. La.),
aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
125 United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 89-91 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
126 Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 1205 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 119 (5th
Cir. 1972).
127 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045, 1056-57 (N.D.
Ala. 1973), modified, 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975). An earlier portion of the decree is
reported at 5 FEP Cas. 1253 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
128 United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1107, 1116 (1973); Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108,
1124-25 (N.D. Ala. 1972).
129 Harris, The Title VII Administrator: A Case Study in Judicial Flexibility, 60 CORNELL
L. REV. 53 (1974).
130 Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970), aff'd, 443
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determine the size of their membership objectively by reference
to the number of skilled employees needed in the industry, 31 to
grant a minimum number of work permits annually, and to
grant those permits on a fixed ratio of black-to-white
employees.1 32 The courts have ordered union hiring halls to
maintain separate referral lists for black and white workers,
1 33
required referrals to be made on a "first unemployed, first re-
ferred" basis,'134 required referrals without regard to experience
under the collective agreeement,'35 established quotas for
referral,1 36 and otherwise comprehensively overseen the referral
and hiring procedures of both unions and employers.1 3 7 To
work out the details of these remedies and to exercise continuing
supervision, the courts have appointed administrators as special
masters' 38 and "Advisory Committees" composed of representa-
tives from the union, the employers, minority groups, and gov-
ernmental agencies. 139 These administrators and committees
have collected employment data, instituted new procedures,
heard and decided complaints and claims of violations, and
made recommendations as to changes in the underlying
decrees.
1 40
F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. Plumbers Local
73, 314 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
"I' Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1053-55 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 341 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,
471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
132 United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 341 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
133 Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 2 FEP Cas. 491, 495-96 (E.D. La. 1970).
134 United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1239 (W.D. Wash.
1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v.
Plumbers Local 73, 314 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
"' United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1236 (W.D. Wash.
1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
136 United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
137 United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 341 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Iron-
workers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 2 FEP Cas. 491 (E.D. La.
1970).
13 United States v. Steamfitters Local 638, 360 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
modified, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 328 F.
Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
139 United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970),
aff'd, 443 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). In United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 5 FEP Cas. 1253 (N.D. Ala. 1973), an "Implementation
Committee," composed of one union representative, one management representative,
and one black employee selected by the court from nominees of the parties, was or-
dered to assist in the implementation of the court's degree. 5 FEP Cas. at 1255-56.
"' For a discussion of the operation of these devices see Harris, supra note 129.
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The work sharing remedy is much less complex and much
less intrusive, with regard to both management and the collective
agreement, than the promotion or hiring hall remedies. Work
sharing leaves the seniority structure undisturbed, avoids rather
than requires transfers, and does not touch the union admissions
or hiring process. The primary question is which device or com-
bination of devices of work sharing can best accommodate the
needs of the employer and the employees. To answer this ques-
tion the court can ask the plaintiffs, the employer, and the union
to make recommendations, jointly if they can agree or separately
if they cannot. When necessary, administrators or advisory
committees can be named by the court to work out details and
provide continuing supervision. Any agreement between an em-
ployer and union regarding work sharing should be adopted
if it fully protects recently hired minorities from adverse con-
sequences, because it has been reached by the preferred
method of collective bargaining.
Without discounting the complexity of problems that may
arise, or be generated by recalcitrant employers and unions,
there is no reason to believe that courts will be any less capable
of designing and administering work sharing procedures in
layoff cases than they have been in designing and administering
remedies in the promotion and hiring hall cases. Indeed, the
task would seem to be much simpler.
IV. BEYOND THE LIMITS OF WORK SHARING
As has been argued earlier, in most situations work sharing
will not impose on the employer or the employee group a bur-
den substantial enough to justify use of layoff as a business
necessity. In most cases the burdens will not even compare, in
terms of disruption of established seniority systems, intrusions
into management decisions, or financial costs, to those imposed
by courts in promotion cases. Special situations may arise, how-
ever, in which work sharing in any form will impose unusually
heavy burdens, particularly when economic conditions require
permanent reductions of half or more of the work force. How
heavy the burden must become to meet the test of business
necessity need not, and cannot, be defined here, because the
courts have not yet articulated clear standards in cases in which
the test has been applied.
141
141 See note 104 supra. The courts have gone little further than to say that business
necessity may be absent even when the costs are "not insubstantial," Jones v. Lee Way
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When work sharing reaches its limits as a suitable alterna-
tive, and layoff meets the test of business necessity, then there
must be some order for deciding who shall continue to work and
who shall not. When that point is reached, and the collective
agreement provides that the order of layoff shall be in accord-
ance with seniority, the court has no suitable alternative to the
application of contractual seniority.
Selecting employees for layoff on the basis of "merit and
ability" would risk arbitrariness to which minorities and women
would be particularly vulnerable without intensive policing by
the court or the imposition of quotas. To make financial need a
touchstone would require inquiries into marital status, family
responsibility, number of wage earners in the household, and
general economic circumstances. We have no accepted standards
for measuring need that a court could apply to judge relative
entitlement to employment.' 42 Use of chronological age or even
a lottery would provide a "neutral" criterion but would not re-
spond to any social values.
143
The values of seniority in preventing arbitrariness and
enabling employees to earn more than daily wages by their work
have already been stated. More than that, the prevalent use of
the seniority principle in our society, particularly in the indus-
trial community, expresses a consensus that length of service
should count when choices must be made between employees.
Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954
(1971). Costs resulting from strikes or threats of strikes or from loss of morale of white
employees because of disappointed seniority expectations are not to be considered. See
Comment, supra note 47, at 115 n.70.
142 In many European countries such considerations are routinely factored into the
layoff process, see R. MARTIN & R. FRYER, REDUNDANCY AND PATERNALIST CAPITALISM
112-14 (1973); and the International Labour Conference has recommended that such
factors be considered in the layoff process, see INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, REPORT
OF THE FOURTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE I.L.O., TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT (DISMISSAL
AND LAYOFF) 38 (1962).
Although a few union-negotiated agreements provide special seniority protection
for aged and physically handicapped workers, these provisions are considered excep-
tional. Only one of the 1,845 contracts in the BLS sample mentioned "family status" as a
consideration in determining order of layoff. BLS, LAYOFF, supra note 14, at 34.
To the extent that such criteria were ever formally taken into account in determin-
ing order of layoffs in this country, union efforts to eliminate all potential means of
employer arbitrariness soon ended the practice. Of "107 agreements negotiated between
1923 and 1929 which restricted layoffs solely by a seniority clause, 101 provided for
so-called 'straight' seniority, that is, seniority not modified by ability" or other factors.
UNION POLICIES, supra note 95, at 116. By 1960 the transition had effectively been made
from "layoff by criteria to tailor-made layoff systems" based on length of service, which
were entirely self-administering. SLICHTER, supra note 23, at 155.
1
43 See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
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Seniority reflects community values and expectations and has
acquired a moral claim; to discard that standard and substitute
another to determine who should be laid off would create a
strong sense of injustice in the entire community. Title VII gives
voice to these values; when there is no suitable alternative to
layoff, the letter and spirit of Title VII counsel the court to give
recognition to established seniority rules.
